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Abstract
The aim of this essay is to explore how to raise the question of Being in education by way of
Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. Phenomenological ontology is a way of approaching
and conducting philosophy exemplified in Heidegger’s Being and Time. To prepare the way for
raising the question of Being in education, a nuanced understanding of Heidegger’s
phenomenological analyses on truth and language is summarized. Thereafter, the manner in
which Being is referenced is analyzed before considering the way of Heidegger’s
phenomenological ontology. In conclusion, existing attempts and continuing efforts to explore the
question of Being in education through phenomenological ontology are outlined. At a time when
decontextualized and reductive ways of knowing and being are becoming the norm within
education, phenomenological ontology offers new possibilities for scholarship and practice. The
present inquiry does not offer solutions in the traditional sense, but rather traces a path that opens
and keeps in tension the question of Being in education in order to support further study.

Introduction and the Scope of the Inquiry
At a time when decontextualized and reductive ways
of knowing and being are becoming the norm within
education, phenomenological ontology can offer new
possibilities for scholarship and practice (KrugerRoss, 2014; Magrini, 2014). As exemplified in the
work of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger,
phenomenological ontology is a way of approaching
and conducting philosophy. While phenomenological
ontology as a way of doing philosophy may be best
illustrated in Heidegger’s magnum opus Being and
Time (1927/1996), Heidegger was also renowned for
his commanding presence as a teacher and public
speaker. Students and auditors of his lectures have
described Heidegger’s presence as “nothing short of
electrifying” (Polt, 1999, p. 19) as he guided his
listeners through his analyses into the being of the
phenomenon in question. Much of what is commonly

known about his teaching persona is provided through
student accounts, including those of Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Karl Löwith, Walter Biemel, and Hannah
Arendt. A common pedagogical strategy Heidegger
used in his teaching was approaching and laying out
his thesis by taking the title of the announced lecture
or course, sometimes word-by-word, and completely
transforming the common sense meaning to reveal
another facet of his “thinking of Being”1. In this way,
the lecture title became not a description or
representation of the work to follow, but rather the
source and guideline for the entire inquiry. The
present study will follow Heidegger’s approach, albeit
with much less skill and care than a lecture given by
Heidegger.
1

“In distinction from mastering beings, the thinking of
thinkers is the thinking of Being.” (Heidegger, 1942-43/
1992, p. 7)
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Even though we will not be this dramatic or as clever,
the title is accurate in laying out the trajectory of the
inquiry. The aim of what follows is to explore how to
raise the question of Being in education by way of
Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. We begin
with grounding a more nuanced understanding of
language in preparation for raising the question.
Thereafter, the manner in which Being is referenced
is analyzed before we turn to considering the way of
Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. Finally, we
will consider both existing attempts and continuing
efforts to find the way of phenomenological ontology
into the question of Being in education.

a propositional statement is uttered that, should it be
considered “true”, marks an adequate representation
of a state of affairs. “The pen is on the table” is a true
statement once it is confirmed that the pen referred to
is indeed on the table. Put differently, if a statement
corresponds to the way things are at a given moment,
then that statement is evaluated as being true. The
representationalist or correspondence theory of truth
then informs the foundational structure of language
and grounds human beings’ ability to communicate.
An example from the classroom is easy to name:
consider the common assessment tool of the “True or
False” examination question.

Raising the Question

Through his analysis of the essence of truth,
Heidegger uncovers a more primordial, to use his
language, meaning of truth in the Greek word
aletheia. Aletheia, translated as unconcealment, is
best grasped as the interplay between the revealing
and concealing of a being or entity. For Heidegger,
the representationalist/correspondence approach is
only partially correct. When we grasp truth as what is
revealed or unconcealed (as represented), we are only
half correct, because we must also, in order to honour
truth as aletheia, consider what remains concealed or
hidden. Heidegger uncovers additional insights such
as untruth that, while remarkable and insightful, must
be left unaddressed. Grasping truth as aletheia, while
a fruitful ground for further thinking, complicates
communication and traditional understandings of
language – especially communicating about Being.

“Raising” the question is oddly worded. Why not
simply state the proposition matter-of-factly: asking
the question? Asking means something other than
what is denoted by the word raising. To raise the
question elevates its importance and is more meaningladen than to ask the question. To raise the question
incorporates the asking, but also takes a step back and
charges the inquirer to carefully and reflectively
consider the manner by which the question is
approached. This distinction reminds the inquirer that,
to engage faithfully with Heidegger’s thinking, the
importance he placed on challenging the traditional
understandings of (1) truth and (2) language must be
acknowledged. Therefore, in this section the question
will be raised by considering Heidegger’s thinking on
truth as aletheia and on the nature of language.
Obviously, a complete summary and treatment of
Heidegger’s thinking on truth and language is not
possible here. However, there are insights in this
arena of his thinking that, were they not discussed,
would diminish the accomplishment of the present
inquiry. Heidegger’s approach to truth and language
respectively not only counters traditional understandings of these philosophical topics, but is also
interwoven with his phenomenological ontology into
the meaning of Being. As Nicholson (2015) notes, for
Heidegger truth is understood as a phenomenon, and
therefore worthy of phenomenological inquiry.
Therefore, we will begin with Heidegger’s thinking
on truth before turning to his reflections on language.
In “On the Essence of Truth”, Heidegger (1930/1949)
conducts a phenomeno-ontological destruction of the
representationalist theory of truth that constitutes the
foundation of the history of philosophy, logic and
metaphysics. This destruction, as Thomson (2005)
notes, is pursued not in the spirit of the critic or
nihilist, but rather in an attempt to uncover and
analyze the concept or idea in question. The representationalist approach, or correspondence theory, has
been understood as commonsensical for so long that it
is often considered illogical to question it. Put simply,

Even prior to the 1930 lecture on truth, Heidegger can
be seen struggling to communicate his inquiries into
Being from the very first lecture courses of 1919–
1920. Heidegger is often criticised for his obtuse
writing and his incorporation of unusual uses of
language in his lectures and speeches. While this
criticism is to some extent justified, throughout his
life Heidegger was attempting to put into language a
new and radically different thinking of Being, using a
language that limited his ability to do so at every turn.
How does one convey insights about the being of
beings when the very language used reduces such
insights almost instantaneously to a representational,
or being as a being, understanding? In History of the
Concept of Time, Heidegger (1925/1985) states: “If
we are forced here to introduce ponderous and
perhaps inelegant expressions, it is not a matter of
personal whim or a special fancy for my own
terminology, but the compulsion of the phenomena
themselves” (p. 151). The phenomenon in question is
the meaning or truth of Being.
Heidegger’s later inquiries into language are a more
focused exposition of his attempts to language his
thinking. Through his encounters with the early Greek
thinkers and the German poet Hölderlin, to name only
two examples, Heidegger became convinced that the
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poetic use of language best exemplified the essence of
language, and possibly Being. The interplay between
unconcealing/concealing of truth as aletheia, along
with the challenge of shaking off the metaphysical
baggage of representationalist language, became a
lifelong journey for Heidegger, one that never came
to rest. With the challenges of using representational
language briefly sketched, we turn to the phenomenon
in question: the question of Being in education.
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Being. Capobianco (2010) points out that Heidegger’s
own fuzzy and inconsistent use of language also
complicates an adequate grasping of the sense in
which he approaches the question of Being. Two
other difficulties that lie at the core of his thinking,
truth and language, were discussed above. But first
we must gain clarity on what sense of Being is in
question at present.
The Whatness and Thatness of Being

Of Being in Education
The question of Being in education gives pause for
thought. Not only is the wording strange (for what is a
“question of Being”?), but the meaning of “Being”
and “in education” is unclear and unspecific. “What
does it mean to be in education?” is one possible
interpretation of the question that, while pointing in
the right direction, does not fully grasp the question
of Being as such. However, odd wording and lack of
clarity aside, the gist of the pause inspired by the
question is not easily summarized, nor is it easy to
grasp and bind. Heidegger writes in Being and Time
that the phenomenon of Being is that which is closest
to and yet also farthest away from human beings
(1927/1996, p. 13).
To begin, we must first distinguish how the word
Being is referenced in this essay. The entire argument
of what follows collapses without at least a sketch of
the phenomenon in question. Distinguishing the
phenomenological ontology of Martin Heidegger is,
interestingly, somewhat easier to grasp than “raising
the question of Being in education”. For not only is
grasping an understanding of the manner in which the
term Being is here being used necessary before a
fuller treatment of Heidegger and phenomenological
ontology, but we will encounter the phenomenological ontology of Heidegger along the way as we gain
further clarity as to what raising the question of Being
in education implies.
Distinguishing the ways that Being can be defined
and used for analysis in raising the question of Being
is the most crucial ground from which to start.
Heidegger’s “one thought” throughout his career was
the meaning of Being. While he used other words and
phrases throughout his lifetime, including das
Ereignis, aletheia, and die Lichtung, each is but
another approach to the same phenomenon of Being
(Capobianco, 2010). This much is generally accepted
by Heideggerian scholars, with Thomas Sheehan
(2001; 2014) and Kenneth Maly (1993) offering
compelling arguments to the contrary. However, what
are not as well understood are the different senses of
Being that Heidegger used to guide his analysis. This
is due in part to a difficulty in translating from
German into English the nuanced manner in which
Heidegger attempted to communicate his thinking of

The first and easiest access to Being is the traditional
sense: by understanding being as a being or an entity.
Within educational practice and scholarship this
understanding of being is readily accessible. Both
practitioners and scholars can easily list beings
necessary in the practice and study of education,
including students, teachers, subject matter, learning
objectives, grades, desks, computers, and so forth. Put
differently, this sense of being is concerned with the
what of a particular being or entity. While this is the
common sense view of being, this view assumes an
understanding of Being as what is present and lasting,
or enduring. Understanding Being as a being cannot
be the way to understand Being in the present inquiry,
given that almost all research and thinking into
education assumes this definition of Being.
If the traditional understanding of Being inheres in
the concrete grasping of Being as a particular being,
then the second and related sense is more abstract.
This manner of approaching being is typically
described as the being of a being, such as the being of
a student or the being of a subject matter. This mode
of under-standing being is also described as the
being-ness of beings, or a being’s essential presence
or essence. Whereas understanding being as a being
or entity focuses on the what of a being,
understanding being as the being of a being aims for
that a being is in such or such a way. Even as this
second manner of approaching Being becomes more
difficult to grasp in language, it is of direct concern
for the present inquiry into raising the question of
Being in education.
For example, put in another way, questioning about
the Being of teaching can to some extent be captured
in the questions: “What does it mean to be a teacher?”
and “Who and how is the being that teaches?” When
asked, this type of question is usually addressed
within the mode of understanding being as a being
rather than the being of being. This can be explained
by the limits of the human ability to use language to
distinguish the manner of this questioning. Regardless, for Heidegger, these two senses of being, as an
entity of enduring presence and as the being-ness of
being, represent the core concern of metaphysics.
However, Heidegger’s thinking of Being is altogether
different from metaphysics as traditionally under-
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stood, and it is in this sense that the term Being is
used in this inquiry into Being in education.
The Ur-Phenomenon of Being
Richard Polt selects the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” as the key to unlocking
Heidegger’s thinking of Being. This question comes
at the conclusion of Heidegger’s 1929 inaugural
lecture at the University of Freiburg entitled “What is
Metaphysics?” and begins the 1935 lecture course
Introduction to Metaphysics. Polt (1999) clarifies the
thrust of Heidegger’s fundamentally transformed
understanding of Being:
[W]hat is it about our condition that lets
Being have a meaning for us? In other words,
why does it make a difference to us that there
is something rather than nothing? This is a
crucial question about ourselves – for if we
were indifferent to the difference between
something and nothing, we would be sunk in
oblivion. We constantly distinguish between
something and nothing, by recognizing
countless things as real while rejecting
falsehoods and illusions. The process is at
work not only in philosophy, but in the
simplest everyday tasks: I recognize a pitcher
as a being simply by reaching for its handle.
It is clear that without our sensitivity to
Being, we would not be human at all. Even
for the most apathetic or shell-shocked
individual, Being means something – although
it is hard to put this meaning into words.
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as Being). However, “The Being of beings ‘is’ not
itself a being” (1927/1996, p. 26) and the ontological
difference can best be understood as the difference
this claim makes to us as human beings.
The ontological difference is often reflected in
terminology, such as the difference between beings
and Being, or between the ontic and the ontological.
While the ontological difference was pre-eminent in
Heidegger’s thought in lecture courses and writings
from the 1920s, this key distinction, in allowing for
catching sight of Being, remains a feature of his
thought for the remainder of his career (see Harman,
2007, pp. 45-48). It is our being so wrapped up in our
own existence that makes the idea or thinking of
Being – much less the asking of the question of Being
– so tricky and arduous. No wonder that Heidegger
describes Being as that which is closest yet farthest
away (1927/1996, p. 13). For example, a building is a
being, but the Being of the building is itself not a
being. How then do we gain access to Being?
Heidegger suggests that one clue might be through
the sense of smell:
One can, as it were, smell the Being of such
buildings, and often after decades one still
has the scent in one’s nose. The scent
provides the Being of this being much more
directly and truly than it could be communicated by any description or inspection. (1935/
2014, p. 26)
School buildings, hallways and classrooms are said to
have their own specific smells about them. Upon
arrival, a quick inhale can transport one back in time.
The question of Being in education, as Heidegger
intimates, may be more about the nose than the roles
human beings embody.

We are now travelling the path of
Heidegger’s thought. For Heidegger, these
three questions belong together in such a way
that they can be called the question of Being:
he wants to notice the wonder that there is
something rather than nothing, to ask what
difference this makes, and to ask how it can
make a difference to us. (p. 4)

In Education

Heidegger argues that metaphysics assumes and
examines the difference between beings and their
being, or remains locked in a dialogue concerned with
entities and their essences. Heidegger’s own thinking,
however, attempts to retrieve a more originary
conception of Being that reveals and reflects on the
ontological difference between Being (with a capital
B) and being. This understanding is written Being as
Being (and with the capital B at present) in order to
distinguish it from being as an entity or the beingness of a being that marks the assumptions of
metaphysical thinking. The ontological difference is
described by Heidegger (1927/1996) in Being and
Time as the difference between the ontic (beings;
beings in their beingness) and the ontological (Being

Given that the nature and focus of education has been
left both undefined and unspecified (as opposed to,
for example, vocational education, K-12 education or
higher education), education can be conceived of in
the broadest terms possible as a human capacity and
endeavour. Education, as a process of teaching and
learning in formal and informal settings, is a thriving
area of scholarship and philosophical study. However,
it can benefit profoundly from more extensive
analysis via phenomenological ontology. Specifically,
answering the question of Being in education requires
Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology.
Why raise the question of Being in education at all?
In addition to James Magrini’s (2014) call for greater
thought regarding the dominance of social efficiency
and instrumentalism in education, the philosopher of
education Michael Peters (2005; 2009) has argued for
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bringing Heidegger into greater dialogue within the
field of philosophy of education. Peters (2009)
contends that: “Heidegger and his forms of
phenomenology have been a neglected figure in the
field of philosophy of education in the English
speaking world. … [A] convincing argument can be
made for the centrality of his philosophy to
education” (pp. 1-2). Considering Heidegger not only
as a philosopher, but also as a teacher, is worthy of
reflection, given that “[n]o philosopher since Socrates
was so committed to questions of education and to
good teaching as Heidegger” (Peters, 2009, p. 3).
Donald Vandenberg, an early advocate for the
intersection of Heidegger’s thinking and educational
scholarship and practice, asks a poignant question in
arguing for the thinking of Being in education:
How can Heidegger’s analysis of human
existence as being there, as Dasein, as
articulated in his magnum opus, help us to
understand the educational journey of
becoming who one can become, oneself, as
distinct from becoming what other people
want one to be, rather than who one is?
(2008, p. 261)
Approaching the answer to Vandenberg’s question
requires a turn to the way of Heidegger’s thinking:
phenomenological ontology.
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inquiry. For example, in the Le Thor and Zähringen
seminars that took place during the last decade of his
life, Heidegger (1966-73/2012) continues to name his
approach phenomenology even while simultaneously
continuing to push the boundaries of metaphysical
language:
I name the thinking here in question
tautological thinking. It is the primordial
sense of phenomenology. Further, this kind
of thinking is before any possible distinction
between theory and praxis. To understand
this we need to learn to distinguish between
“path” and “method”. In philosophy, there
are only paths; in the sciences, on the
contrary, there are only methods, that is,
modes of procedure. (p. 80)
Methodology, as it is traditionally understood, is best
grasped within Heidegger’s thinking as a way. The
word “way” must be heard as addressing not only a
what but, even more importantly, a how of doing
philosophy. For Heidegger, phenomenological ontology is the pathway to the meaning of the question of
Being, not in a prescriptive sense but in an attuned
and receptive manner. In the following section, the
relationship between ontology, phenomenology and
Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology is addressed.
Heidegger’s Phenomenological Ontology

By Way Of

The collected edition should indicate various
ways: it is underway in the field of paths of
the self-transforming asking of the manysided question of Being … . The point is to
awaken the confrontation about the question
concerning the topic of thinking … and not to
communicate the opinion of the author, and
not to characterize the standpoint of the
writer, and not to fit into the series of other
historically determinable philosophical standpoints. Of course, such a thing is always
possible, especially in the information age,
but for preparing the questioning access to
the topic of thinking, it is completely useless.
(GA1, pp. 437-438; in Polt, 1999, p. 116)

With the question of Being as our focus, we are
already within the realm of ontology. Ontology is the
philosophical domain and distinction that denotes the
study of reality, of all that is. Specifically, and in a
Heideggerian sense, ontology is often referred to as
the science or study of being as such and in general.
Where ontology stands within Heidegger’s thinking
as a whole is complicated by his struggle to name and
provoke the fundamental matter for thinking, the
question of Being. As Heidegger’s thinking matured,
he came to consider ontology as in the service of
metaphysics, and metaphysics as the ultimate realm
of philosophy and philosophizing. If ontology refers
to the study of Being and beings in the sense framed
by traditional metaphysics as being and their beingness, then Heidegger would not accept the use of this
term. But if ontology were to point to thinking of
Being as Being, Heidegger would concur. But how to
approach the question of Being? For Heidegger, ontology was rightly understood as accessible only via
phenomenology (1927/1996, p. 31).

While the later Heidegger focused on analyzing the
historicity of Being in relationship to, for example,
art, technology, and poetry, in the first part of his life
he was quick to name his way toward the question of
Being: phenomenology. Even in his later teachings, he
remained faithful to the manner of phenomenological

Traditionally understood, phenomenology is the study
of the lived experience of human beings. For Edmund
Husserl, Heidegger’s teacher and mentor, the foundation of phenomenological study was consciousness, as
is evidenced in the epistemological method of the
epoché. This was troubling for Heidegger, because

Ways or paths are important in Heidegger’s thinking;
so important that he urged readers in the draft preface
to his Gesamtausgabe [Collected Works] to consider
his published writings as “ways, not works”:
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Being was, via Husserl’s methodological bracketing,
presupposed. In Being and Time, Heidegger (1927/
1996) transformed Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology into phenomenological ontology, or the
phenomenological inquiry into the question of the
meaning of Being. In his early to mid-career, roughly
from 1920 through the mid-1930s, Heidegger referred
to his methodological approach to philosophical
inquiry as fundamental ontology, but this naming was
simply another way of saying phenomenological
ontology. In addition to Being and Time, two lecture
courses, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927/
1982) and The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic
(1928/1984), offer Heidegger’s own description of his
way into the question of Being. These lecture courses
are critical for understanding phenomenological
ontology, as they directly followed the publication of
Being and Time, wherein Heidegger demonstrated the
carrying out of a fundamental ontology into the being
of Dasein.
Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology seeks to
ground and understand phenomena not only as they
appear and are constituted in lived experience, but
also as the phenomena are experienced contextually,
temporally and historically via Dasein. Van Manen
(1990) describes Dasein as “a Heideggerian term
which refers to that entity or aspect of our humanness
which is capable of wondering about its own
existence and inquiring into its own Being” (p. 176).
Some scholars recommend substituting “human
being” for Dasein, but this could be misleading, as
Heidegger uses the term to denote much more. For
this reason, Dasein is almost always left untranslated
in English translations of Heidegger’s thinking.
Specifically, Dasein is the root of phenomenological
ontology.
Dasein literally translated means being-there or therebeing (Da - there/here, sein - being). As Dasein, we
are there-being because we are as we are and where
we are. Dasein is thus only Dasein insofar as it is
connected with its there, or its world. Heidegger’s use
of the word Dasein at once brings human beings to
account for themselves as beings while yet not
transforming Dasein into a super-category of Being.
Dasein is us in our everydayness. Heidegger (1927/
1996) writes:
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This everydayness of Dasein’s existence Heidegger
uses to build his existential analysis in Being and
Time, and, ultimately, to prepare his reader for the
raising of the question of the meaning of Being.
Dasein is not, however, another thing or object “out
there” in the world. As Kisiel (2002) comments:
Contrary to the usual categories, the very
term Da-sein does not express a what but a
way to be (Weise zu sein), and so all further
investigation of it is aimed at explicating its
specific ways to be (later called the
existentials by Heidegger): to be in the world,
to be authentically or inauthentically, to be
toward death, etc., with a decided penchant
toward prepositional phrases and adverbs
serving to qualify the verbal “to be”. As the
investigation proceeds, Heidegger at times
even expresses an aversion to referring to
Dasein as an entity, a term which traditionally in our vocabulary and grammar is
fraught with the connotations of the
substantiality of a thing. The “I” of Dasein is
not a thing but a way to be, not a what but a
who, with its connotations of orientation to a
unique situation. (p. 54)
Kisiel’s commentary is critical not only for grasping
the meaning of Heidegger’s Dasein, but also for
expanding the traditional or common sense understandings of being we encountered above.
The 1927 lecture course, The Basic Problems of
Phenomenology, has come to be widely regarded as
the unpublished third section of Being and Time, and
includes an account of Kant’s theses on being and the
Aristotelian concept of time and temporality. Included
in the preparatory notes and course overview,
however, is a particularly coherent review of the
character of phenomenological ontology (1927/1982,
pp. 19-23). In his “Translator’s Introduction”, Albert
Hofstadter notes:

Dasein always understands itself in terms of
its existence, in terms of its possibility to be
itself or not be itself. Dasein has either
chosen these possibilities itself, stumbled
upon them, or in each instance already grown
up in them. Existence is decided only by each
Dasein itself in the manner of seizing upon or
neglecting such possibilities. We come to
terms with the question of existence always
only through existence itself. (p. 10)

Heidegger conceived of phenomenology in a
way that departed from the Husserlian mode
of analysis of consciousness. Phenomenology
became for him the method of philosophy
understood as ontology. All the propositions
of ontology are, in his view, a priori, having
to do with being rather than beings; for being
must be understood prior to all encounter
with and understanding of beings. Heidegger
connects this doctrine of the apriority of
philosophy with a unique conception of the
manner in which time functions as the source
of the a priori. Phenomenology, which looks
to “the things themselves”, without theoretical preconceptions, and wills only to unveil
beings and being in their evident truth, is of
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necessity the method which philosophy as
thus conceived will employ. (1982, p. xvii)
Phenomenology, rightly understood by Heidegger as
the method of ontology, comprises three movements:
the phenomenological reduction, construction, and
destruction. Ontology must always begin with a being
– but Heidegger (1927/1982) emphasizes that “Being
is always being of beings”:
Apprehension of being, ontological investigation, always turns, at first and necessarily,
to some being; but then, in a precise way, it
is led away from that being and led back to
its being. We call this basic component of
phenomenological method – the leading back
or re-duction of investigative vision from a
naively apprehended being to being –
phenomenological reduction. (p. 21)
Here Heidegger deliberately incorporates and transforms the Husserlian phenomenological reduction as
the foundation of phenomenological ontology. Once
the being of being has been understood through the
reduction, phenomenological construction offers
guidance in approaching Being. “Being does not
become accessible like a being. We do not simply
find it in front of us … it must always be brought to
view in a free projection” (1927/1982, pp. 21-22). If
phenomenological reduction leads the inquiry away
from a being such that its being can be apprehended,
the construction is the glimpse or flash of Being and
its structures as one is drawn back toward the being.
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phenomenology as hermeneutics. He acknowledges
the interpretative thrust of his phenomenological
descriptions as a feature of logos, or of “letting
something be seen as something” as in an apophantic
saying. Heidegger is here contextualizing the three
movements in his phenomenology – reduction,
construction, and destruction – as interpretative
movements, a way that allows for entities to show
themselves as themselves. This radicalization transforms not only Husserl’s phenomenological method,
but also the traditional discipline of hermeneutics.
With his transforming of Husserl’s transcendental
phenomenology of consciousness into an interpretative inquiry into the ontological foundations of
Western metaphysics, Heidegger launched an entire
movement in philosophical thought that has made him
the most influential philosopher of the 20th century.
Almost all of the prominent French and German
philosophers from the past four to five decades –
including Jurgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, Jacques
Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze – have acknowledged the
influence of Heidegger’s thought on their own work.
While phenomenology as traditionally understood can
approach and describe the lived experience of human
beings, it is by way of phenomenological ontology
that Being is allowed to, in Heideggerian terms, show
itself in itself. In the following section, existing
approaches at the intersection of the question of
Being in education and phenomenological ontology
are explored.
Existing Approaches

The final component in this triadic approach is
phenomenological destruction, “a critical process in
which the traditional concepts, which at first must be
necessarily employed, are de-constructed down to the
sources from which they were drawn” (1927/1982, p.
23). Because ontology is always a study of the being
of some being, and specifically (for Heidegger) the
being of Dasein as that being for whom Being
matters, ontology must be understood within its
historical and temporal contexts. As such, Being itself
is always historically and temporally situated, and
only via the phenomenological destruction “can
ontology fully assure itself in a phenomenological
way of the genuine character of its concepts” (p. 23).
Van Manen (1990) writes of the need for destruction
when he notes that “the problem of phenomenological
inquiry is not always that we know too little about the
phenomenon we wish to investigate, but that we know
too much (p. 46).

Despite early attempts to bring phenomenological
ontology into direct conversation with educational
studies and philosophy of education (Denton, 1974;
Vandenberg, 1982; 1997) interest is only now taking
hold. Gloria Dall’Alba’s (2009) Exploring Education
through Phenomenology – which comprises papers
drawn from those presented at the symposium on
phenomenology in education Dall’Alba convened at
the European Conference on Educational Research
held in Geneva in 2006, as well as those reviewed for
publication in a special edition of Educational
Philosophy and Theory (February, 2009) – showcases
a diverse range of phenomenologically-grounded
approaches to studying educational phenomena.
However, only two of these specifically utilize
Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology to address
educational practice. The remaining authors conduct
their inquiries by way of the traditional transcendental
phenomenology.

Heidegger also describes his phenomenological
approach in Being and Time (§7, specifically) as an
interpretative method. After deconstructing phenomenology into its components (phenomenon and
logos), Heidegger circles back to redefine and situate

Scholarly exploration of Heidegger’s pedagogy is
becoming more common within Heideggerian studies
(Ehrmantraut, 2010) and philosophy of education
(Riley, 2011). Donald Vandenberg, a lifelong scholar
of Heidegger, Being, and education, wrote an article
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entitled “A Guide to Educational Philosophizing after
Heidegger” (2008) that traced his own work and that
of others in bringing Heidegger’s thought to bear in
the areas of philosophy and phenomenology of
education (see the articles by Bingham, Peterson,
Ream & Ream, and Waddington which appeared in
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 37(4), 2005).
While rather tersely composed, Vandenberg also
criticizes four articles published within the field of
philosophy of education that, directly and indirectly,
take up Heidegger’s phenomenological philosophy.
Vandenberg’s primary cause of complaint is twofold:
(1) ignorance of existing work in the phenomenology
of education inspired by Heidegger, and (2) lack of a
genuine understanding of Heidegger’s thinking.
Vandenberg’s account points to a lack of coherence
of phenomenological thinking within philosophy of
education, as well as the absence of a predominant
perspective on Heidegger’s thinking in the study of
education and philosophy.
In an attempt to collect and retell the history of
phenomenology and existentialism in educational
philosophy, Magrini recently published a book-length
study on ontology, phenomenology and philosophical
hermeneutics in education (2014). This study is in
addition to, and the culmination of, a number of
shorter works on the same subject (e.g., Magrini,
2011; 2012; 2013a; 2013b). The intent of Magrini’s
scholarship is to “contribute to envisioning a model of
curriculum and education that is, in the first instance,
ontological in nature” (2014, p. 2). This approach, he
argues, would counter “the impoverished ontological
state of contemporary standardized education (social
efficiency), outlining the potential devastating effects
of the learning sciences on the Being of both
educators and students, on phenomenological selfhood” (2013b, p. 1). In respect of phenomenological
ontology, Magrini works towards bringing together
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Dasein from
Being and Time and the “human science research” of
van Manen. He asserts that, “Unlike Husserl ... I am
unconcerned with the transcendental consciousness
and the intentional structures that constitute the
subject’s cognitive experience” (2014, p. 2). Magrini
(2011/2012a) enters into dialogue with the field of
curriculum studies (e.g., Aoki, 2005; Pinar, 2013) via
Huebner’s (1974; 1999) insights into Heidegger and
phenomenology. He further offers many “ontological
footholds” (Heidegger, 1927/1996, p 59) on being
educated, ontological learning, and phenomenological
selfhood. These are but a few insights to be gained
from Magrini’s attempts to ground education as an
ontological experience.
Outside of philosophy of education, Heideggerian
scholars, in exploring questions related to education,
turn to the work of Iain Thomson (2001; 2004; 2005).
Thomson, who studied under the noted American
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philosopher Hubert Dreyfus, argues that Heidegger’s
philosophy needs to be read and understood as an
ontotheological approach rather than simply as an
ontological-phenomenological destruction of Western
metaphysics. While being somewhat at odds with
current perspectives on Heidegger’s work, Thomson
claims that, by approaching Heidegger’s thinking as
ontotheology, Heidegger’s insights into education,
technology and politics can be more profoundly
understood. More especially, Thomson demonstrates
that there exists a continuous thread through
Heidegger’s lifetime of thinking that calls for an
“ontologization” of education (2004; 2005).
The research currently underway at the intersection of
phenomenological ontology and education is, in
general, promising. This section has focused briefly
on recent scholarship occurring at this crossroads
between teaching, learning, and philosophical inquiry.
Specifically, Thomson (2005) and Magrini (2014)
offer particularly interesting trajectories of inquiry
into the question of Being in education that honour
the ontological thrust of Heideggerian phenomenological ontology. However, this scholarship remains
focussed on Heidegger’s thinking of Being in relation
to education, while not more particularly engaging in
phenomenological ontology into the lived experiences
of those phenomena that constitute the teachinglearning context. In short, while the work of Thomson
(2005) and Magrini (2014) is critical to approaching
the question of Being in education, neither takes the
crucial next step: thinking the Being of education by
way of phenomenological ontology. The final section
of this essay indicates those who have walked the way
of phenomenological ontology, and offers concluding
thoughts.
Continuing Efforts and Concluding Thoughts
Being and Time, Heidegger’s magnum opus, and the
first text to engage in the philosophical manner that
we have been referencing as phenomenological
ontology, remained unfinished. At present, scholars
are still unsure of how to characterize this attempt to
inquire into the meaning of the meaning of Being.
Was Heidegger’s project a failure? Can we identify
the missing half of Being and Time in his other
published writings and courses? What are we to make
of the text in relation to the whole of Heidegger’s
thinking? It seems to me that those who come to
Heidegger’s thinking looking for firm and direct
answers to questions are misguided and do not fully
grasp the thrust of his lifelong project. Returning to
Heidegger’s comments, just days before his death, in
the proposed preface to the Gesamtausgabe – “The
point is to awaken the confrontation about the
question concerning the topic of thinking” (quoted in
Polt, 1999, p. 116). I argue that this is fundamental to
Heidegger’s thinking, that we engage in holding open
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the questions such that in this tension the questions
remain as questions before collapsing into answers. In
this way, it will be phenomenological ontology that
supports us as we get “underway in the field of paths
of the self-transforming asking of the many-sided
question of Being” (ibid.).
Thomson’s (2005; Thomas & Thomson, 2015) highlighting of Heidegger’s vision for an ontologization of
education is inspiring. One can find, in between
Thomson’s analysis of Heidegger’s thinking about
education, hints and indications toward educational
phenomena that have been or could be thought by
way of phenomenological ontology. In these glimpses,
Thomson’s scholarship honours van Manen’s (2014)
argument that phenomenology should be regarded
more as a way of questioning than of answering. This
observation is telling, given the shift in van Manen’s
approach from a more representational perspective
(1990) to a focus on the phenomenology of practice
(2014). New possibilities for inquiry and practice
become available when teaching and learning are
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approached as they are experienced in the everyday
lives of human beings. My own work endeavours to
think the fundamental Heideggerian distinctions of
world, attunement, and Enframing in the manner of
phenomenological ontology such that the everyday
practice of teaching is foregrounded (see KrugerRoss, 2013; 2014; in press).
In one of Heidegger’s (1945/2002) most accessible
reflections on his pedagogical stance as a teacher of
philosophy, he engages in a damning critique of the
influence of theoretical abstraction on the teacherstudent relation. This “contractualizing of pedagogy”
(p. 39) comes about as a result of an over-reliance on
theory within the university. However, Heidegger
does not offer practice or even praxis as a resolution
to the challenges inherent in theoretical reflection. His
point, as is so often the case, is to bring the situation
to our attention and to do so in a questioning manner.
This manner is the way of phenomenological ontology – a way to raising the question of Being in
education.
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